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RICCI V. DESTEFANO:+ DILUTING DISPARATE IMPACT AND REDEFINING DISPARATE TREATMENT
BY
ANN C. MCGINLEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on an
individual‘s sex, race, color, national origin and/or religion.1 The statute permits plaintiffs to
bring discrimination cases under two different theories: disparate treatment, which requires a
showing of the employer‘s discriminatory intent, and disparate impact, which holds the employer
liable absent intent to discriminate if it uses neutral employment policies or practices that have a
disparate impact on a protected group. Ricci v. DeStefano significantly affects the interpretation
of both of these theories of discrimination.2
The case arose out of written and oral examinations that the City of New Haven gave in 2003
to its firefighters who applied for promotions to lieutenant and captain positions. 3 Despite the
City‘s hiring of an independent consultant, I/O Solutions (IOS), to create a fair, job related
evaluative instrument, the results of the exam were disconcerting. In a City where more than
one third of the population is black and more than one fourth is Hispanic,4 no blacks and only
two Hispanics would be eligible for promotions. The rest of the promotions would go to white
+

129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009).
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1
It states:
*

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2 (a) (2000).
2
See e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. Destefano: The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of White Privilege,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691083; Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci:
White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507344; Melissa Hart,
From Wards Cove to Ricci: Struggling Against the “Built-in Headwinds” of a Skeptical Court, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1837639; Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010).
3
129 S.Ct. at 2664.
4
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2008), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=Y&-qr_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_DP5&geo_id=16000US0952000&-context=adp&-ds_name=&-tree_id=308&-_lang=EN&-redoLog=false&-format=.

firefighters.5 This result obtained even though twenty-seven blacks and twenty-three Hispanics
took the promotional exams.
City leaders, especially the Corporation Counsel, Thomas Ude, worried that the test had an
illegal disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics.6 Because of a history of discrimination and
lawsuits by minority firefighters,7 the City‘s concern was justifiable. Like other fire departments
across the country, white men -- predominately Irish, Italian, and German -- had historically
dominated the New Haven Fire Department.8 Generation upon generation of male firefighters
had handed the jobs down to family members who were almost invariably of the same ethnic
heritage. This structure led to extreme racial underrepresentation in the fire department. For
example, in 1973, firefighters were less than four percent black, and none was Hispanic, even
though minorities represented approximately thirty percent of the City‘s population.9 While
prospects for men of color have improved significantly as a result of a number of lawsuits filed
against the New Haven Fire Department, there is still significant underrepresentation of blacks at
the higher ranks and of Hispanics in firefighter and upper level positions. Today, while thirtyseven percent of the City‘s population is black, approximately thirty percent of the firefighters,
twenty-two percent of the lieutenants and four percent of the captains are black.10 Twenty-six
percent of the New Haven population is Hispanic; thirteen percent of firefighters, fourteen
percent of lieutenants and sixteen percent of captains are Hispanic.11
By city charter, the Civil Service Board (CSB) was responsible to certify the exam results.
After the results of the 2003 exam became public, the CSB held five hearings,12 heard testimony
from various sources and ultimately voted not to certify the results.13 This vote rankled many of
the white members of the fire department who believed that the CSB‘s vote deprived them of an
opportunity for promotions they had earned by doing well on the exam. These promotions come
up rarely, and it could be years before they would have another opportunity.
Backed by the firefighters‘ union, seventeen white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter
who sat for the promotional exams sued, alleging that the City violated Title VII of the 1964
5

Seventy- seven candidates took the lieutenant’s exam: forty-three whites, nineteen blacks and fifteen Hispanics.
Thirty-four passed: twenty-five whites, six blacks and three Hispanics. Forty-one applicants took the captain’s
exam: twenty-five whites, eight blacks and eight Hispanics. Twenty-two passed the exam: sixteen whites, three
blacks and three Hispanics. But passing the test was not enough. Because the City hired from a list which used a
“rule of three” (meaning that the City would consider the top three candidates for each position) only those at the
top of the list were eligible for promotion. For the lieutenant’s position, ten were eligible for promotion to fill eight
positions: all were white. For the captain’s position, nine were eligible for promotion to fill seven spots: seven
whites and two Hispanics. In total, no blacks and two Hispanics were eligible out of the twenty-seven blacks and
twenty-three Hispanics who took the test. 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 144 (D. Conn. 2006).
6
Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006).
7
See Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J. LAW & GENDER 581, 591
(2010).
8
For a discussion of this history, see id. at 588-595.
9
Nicole Allen & Emily Bazelon, The Ladder: Part 4: Is There a Better Way to Decide Who Gets Promoted?, SLATE,
June 25, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2221250/entry2221298/.
10
See Chart provided by Victor Bolden (Dec. 9, 2009)(on file with the Nevada Law Journal).
11
Id.
12
Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145-150 (D. Conn. 2006).
13
554 F. Supp. 2d at 150.

Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution when it threw out the exam results. The plaintiffs alleged that because the City‘s
decision to throw out the test results was based on the race of the successful test takers,14 the City
had acted improperly. It did not matter, according to the plaintiffs, that the City may have acted
in good faith to avoid an illegal disparate impact on protected minorities.15 The mere
consideration of race when the City refused to certify the test was sufficient evidence of
disparate treatment under Title VII. The federal district court disagreed with the plaintiff‘s
theory; it granted the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment,16 and the Second Circuit panel
affirmed summarily.17
Eventually, the case made its way to the United States Supreme Court.18 In a 5-4 decision,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a good faith belief that the testing created an illegal
disparate impact on racial minorities is insufficient as a defense to a disparate treatment claim
that arose as a result of the City‘s overt use of race to throw out the results. 19 Instead, over a
strong dissent, the Court concluded that the City must have ―a strong basis in evidence that, had
it‖ certified the results, ―it would have been liable under [Title VII] disparate-impact‖ theory; the
Court concluded as a matter of law that the defendants did not meet the necessary threshold
standard.20 Because it decided the case under Title VII, the Court did not reach the question of
whether the City‘s behavior was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 21

14

Id. at 144.
The plaintiffs also argued a more nefarious motive on the City’s part. It argued that the City was pressured by a
black minister who used significant political power to influence the City to throw out the results. While this second
version of the events leading to the rejection of the results is not credited by the majority opinion, Justice Alito’s
concurrence takes it as fact. 129 S. Ct. at 2683-89 (Alito, J., concurring).
16
Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006).
17
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008). In a per curiam opinion, the Second Circuit panel stated in part:
15

In this case, the Civil Service Board found itself in the unfortunate position of having no good alternatives.
We are not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ expression of frustration. Mr. Ricci, for example, who is
dyslexic, made intensive efforts that appear to have resulted in his scoring highly on one of the exams,
only to have it invalidated. But it simply does not follow that he has a viable Title VII claim. To the
contrary, because the Board, in refusing to validate the exams, was simply trying to fulfill its obligations
under Title VII when confronted with test results that had a disproportionate racial impact, its actions
were protected.
Id. at 87. Later, the Second Circuit voted not to hear the case en banc. 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008).
It also figured prominently in the Senate confirmation hearings for then Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination to
the United States Supreme Court because Judge Sotomayor had sat on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel
that decided the case against the plaintiffs. For a discussion of the impact of the case on the hearings, see
McGinley supra note 7 at 613-619.
19
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2663-64.
20
Id. at 2664. The Court did not reach the question of whether the disparate impact provision violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see generally, Richard
Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1495870.
21
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence, joined by Justice Alito, that the disparate impact provision
of Title VII violates the Equal Protection Clause. 129 S. Ct. 2681-83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
18

Ricci is important because it redefines discrimination. It adopts a restrictive interpretation of
the disparate impact theory that is inconsistent with Congressional intent and purpose, and
signals that intentional discrimination is more important than disparate impact. Simultaneously,
it appears to broaden the disparate treatment theory, but this new interpretation of disparate
treatment is selective: it expands the definition of discriminatory intent to include any overt
consideration of a protected characteristic. By its literal interpretation of intent - intent means
any conscious, explicit consideration of race in making employment decisions - it appears to
disregard unconscious discrimination or implicit bias as supporting a possible cause of action
under disparate treatment law. 22 These changes in both disparate impact and disparate treatment,
which ignore history and the changing nature of discrimination, make Ricci one of the worst
recent cases decided by the Supreme Court. Ricci sanctions finding discrimination against white
men who have been privileged by history and structure of the fire department while
simultaneously ignoring the history and practices that led to the low numbers of minority men in
supervisory positions in the fire department. It also appears to credit obvious and explicit
discrimination over the less obvious but implicit biases caused by structures and attitudes that
hinder the progress of women and minority men in the workplace.
II.

RICCI‘S HARMS
A. UPSETTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN TREATMENT AND IMPACT

One of the unfortunate aspects of Ricci is the Court‘s treatment of disparate impact as the
illegitimate stepsister of the disparate treatment cause of action. The Court held that even if the
City had discarded the test results in good faith to avoid liability under the disparate impact
clause of Title VII, it would still face liability because it considered the race of the individuals
who would have been eligible for promotion based on the test. The only escape from liability for
disparate treatment against the plaintiffs would be proof of a ―strong basis in evidence‖ that the
City would be liable under disparate impact theory if it chose to award promotions based on the
test results. The Court held further that, as a matter of law, there was no strong basis in evidence
supporting the City‘s refusal to certify the test results. This treatment of the relative importance
of disparate treatment and disparate impact is particularly problematic because of the history of
Title VII.
1. History of Disparate Impact Provisions
The original language of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act mentioned neither intent
nor impact. Rather, it stated that it is illegal to discriminate ―because of‖ a person‘s race or other
protected characteristics. Early on, courts interpreted this language to require a showing of an
intent to discriminate because of an individual‘s membership in a protect class. Soon after
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, however, activists and key personnel at all levels of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖) recognized that a focus on intentional
discrimination under Title VII would limit the statute‘s usefulness in combating racial
22

This conclusion is supported by the decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, ___S.Ct. ___ (2011); 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 4567 (June 20, 2011). For a discussion of the science of implicit bias, see Ann C. McGinley, Discrimination
Redefined, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 441, at 445-449 (2010); Ann C. McGinley, Viva la Evolucion: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 415 (2000); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005).

inequalities in the workplace.23 They began to bring cases in the lower courts to clarify that
disparate impact was a legitimate theory under Title VII. One of these cases, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,24 reached its way to the Supreme Court by 1971. Griggs challenged the defendant‘s
use of intelligence tests and diploma requirements for particular positions within the power
company. The lower court dismissed the case, holding that there was no evidence of intentional
discrimination and therefore a cause of action under Title VII did not exist.25 The Supreme Court
reversed and held that an employer who, absent an intent to discriminate, used a neutral policy
that created a disparate impact on members of a protected class would be liable under Title VII
unless it could prove that its policy had a ―demonstrable relationship to successful performance
of the jobs for which [they were] used.‖ 26 (Griggs 1971:431). The Court declared that the
―touchstone is business necessity,‖ and assigned the employer with the burden of proving that
―any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.‖
(Griggs 1971: 431-32). 27 This interpretation was the law of the land until 1989.
In 1989, eighteen years after Griggs, the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,28 a case that made it much more difficult to prove a disparate impact cause of
action and that held that the burden of proof never shifted to the employer to prove business
necessity. Instead, the plaintiff had to prove the absence of a business justification. In large part
because of substantial opposition to Wards Cove, Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act.29
which restored the disparate impact cause of action. The amended Act included a disparate
impact provision in the statute for the first time. It stated:
(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this title only if —
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in paragraph (C)
with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to
adopt such alternative employment practice.30
For our purposes, the most important lessons we should learn from this history are: first,
Congress considered the disparate impact cause of action so important that it chose to amend the
23

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 24, 73, 78 (1994).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
25
th
420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4 Cir. 1970).
26
401 U.S. at 431.
27
Id. at 431-32.
28
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
29
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, et seq.
30
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Paragraph (C) states: “The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall
be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of ‘alternative
employment practice.’” 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(k)(1)(C).
24

statute to overrule the Supreme Court‘s narrow interpretation of the disparate impact cause of
action; second, when Congress amended the statute, it broadened significantly the interpretation
of the disparate impact provision and restored the job relatedness and business necessity as
affirmative defenses to be proved by the defendant; third, Congress codified case law before
Wards Cove that permitted the plaintiffs to win even if the employer proved job relatedness and
business necessity of the practice in question if the plaintiff could prove that an alternative policy
was available to the employer that would have a less discriminatory effect.
To what extent is Ricci untrue to this Congressional intent and purpose in passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991? As noted above, Ricci appears to see disparate impact as a less important
form of discrimination, one that should yield to disparate treatment. This conclusion quietly
contradicts Congressional purpose in amending the Act to assure the important place of disparate
impact in the statutory scheme. Second, the Court concludes as a matter of law that there is no
strong basis in evidence that the test the firefighters took in Ricci was not business related or
consistent with business necessity or that there were any viable alternatives. But, these
conclusions occur in an unusual procedural setting that deprived the City an opportunity to take
discovery and a viable defense. The Court, in essence, overstepped the bounds of its power by
granting judgment to the plaintiffs without remanding to permit the defendant to prove its case or
for a jury to hear the case.
2. The Procedural Posture in Ricci
To understand the harm in Ricci, we must consider the procedural posture of the case. It is
particularly complicated and few have paid close attention to this aspect of the case. First, the
case was decided below on motions for summary judgment. The federal district court granted
summary judgment to the defendant City in response to the parties‘ cross motions for summary
judgment. It concluded that throwing out a test based on its disparate impact on minority
firefighters did not prove animus or intent to discriminate. On appeal, the Second Circuit panel
affirmed. The Second Circuit then refused to hear the case en banc.
The United States Supreme Court established a new test to determine whether a defendant
employer should be liable in throwing out test results; the Court simultaneously granted
summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Ordinarily when the Supreme Court announces a new
standard under which to evaluate the evidence, it will remand the case to the lower court to
consider the evidence. It would have been appropriate in this case to permit the parties to
develop the evidence through discovery because the Court had announced a new applicable
standard to be applied. Instead, the Supreme Court moved forward even though there was no
trial below and no fact finding by the lower court that the Supreme Court could rely upon. The
Supreme Court then placed the defendant City in the position of proving that it met a standard
that it had never been responsible to meet before without an opportunity to develop the evidence.
And, it required the City, in essence, to make out the case of its own culpability – the case that
potential minority plaintiffs would have made in a hypothetical disparate impact suit against the
City if it had used the test results.
Let‘s clarify this point. Under the 1991 Act, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendant‘s
neutral employment policy created a disparate impact on a protected group. Once that proof is
met, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove its affirmative defense that the
policy – here, the test – was job-related and consistent with business necessity by a

preponderance of the evidence. 31 Once the defendant meets that proof, the burden shifts again to
the plaintiffs to prove that alternative less discriminatory selection criteria exist that the
defendant refused to adopt. 32 If the defendant does not meet its burden of proof on its
affirmative defense, or if the plaintiff can prove less discriminatory alternatives exist, the
plaintiffs – members of the protected class who bring the suit alleging disparate impact -- will
prevail.
In this case, things were tossed on their heads. There was no dispute that the test created
a disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics, but that was not sufficient for the Court. In an
ordinary case, where the plaintiffs are those suffering from the disparate impact, at this point, the
burden of proof would shift to the defendant to prove job relatedness and business necessity.
Here, however, the defendants were put in the position of proving the existence of strong
evidence that the test was not job related and not consistent with business necessity. Because the
City was, in essence, standing in for the minority test takers, it was also asked to prove that there
was strong evidence that an equally valid alternative existed that the City had not adopted.
Remember that in this case there had never been a trial so the evidence had not been developed
before it reached the Supreme Court. Based on the evidence in the record, the Supreme Court
granted judgment to the plaintiffs. This ruling, then, determines that as a matter of law there was
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have concluded that: 1) there was
strong evidence that the test was not job related and consistent with business necessity; and 2)
that there was strong evidence that alternative less discriminatory testing mechanisms existed.
3. Disputing the Evidence on Job Relatedness and Business Necessity
Remember that the evidence considered here was testimony before the Civil Service Board,
offered by the defendant to prove its good faith and lack of discriminatory animus when it threw
out the test. It had not been prepared to respond to the Court‘s newly adopted standard.
Nonetheless, there was significant evidence that the test was not job related or consistent with
business necessity. Although some white firefighters, including Frank Ricci, testified that the
test was fair and job related,33 other firefighters testified that some of the questions tested for
knowledge that was not relevant to firefighting in New Haven. A number of firefighters
complained about several questions that were obviously taken from exams for other cities whose
practices differed from those in New Haven.34 This failure was exacerbated by IOS‘s use, at the
City‘s suggestion, of reviewers before administering the test who were not from New Haven and
who were not familiar with New Haven Fire Department practices.35 There was also testimony
that the materials were available more readily and earlier to the white firefighters because of
their extensive connections to family and friends.36
The CSB also heard from the representative from IOS who explained the care the company
took to assure a fair test and from Christopher Hornick, a testing consultant, who criticized the

31

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e (m); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2 (k)(1)(A)(i)).
See supra note 30.
33
554 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 147.
36
129 S. Ct. at 2693. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32

test.37 Hornick expressed surprise at the disparity in the scores between the whites and the
minority candidates and stated that the statistical disparity might have resulted from the
collective bargaining agreement‘s 60/40% weighting of written and oral examinations.38 He also
posited that the differential may have resulted from the City‘s failure to review the test for
relevancy before it was administered and that there were ―more appropriate ways to assess [a
person‘s] ability to serve as a captain or lieutenant.‖39 Another witness, ―Vincent Lewis, a fire
program specialist from the Department of Homeland Security,‖ testified that he believed that
the candidates should know the materials and that ―the questions were relevant.‖ 40
Moreover, evidence suggested that it was not the test alone that created the problematic
results. Because of an old provision in a collective bargaining agreement (negotiated between the
City and the predominately white union), the City had required IOS to create a written test that
would count for 60% and an oral exam that would count for 40% of the total. Thus, IOS never
considered altering this ratio, even though a representative of the black firefighters‘ professional
association testified that the there was something wrong with the test, and advised the CSB to
look at nearby Bridgeport, Connecticut‘s criteria for promotions.41 Evidence suggested that
Bridgeport, a neighboring community, had achieved diversity throughout its ranks by weighing
the oral portions of the promotional exams more heavily. Testimony also suggested that the
City‘s required treatment of the results might be partially at fault for the results. The City
Charter‘s ―Rule of Three‖ required that for each open position, the City consider the top three
candidates. That meant that only the top ten candidates for the lieutenant‘s position would be
considered for eight open jobs; only the top nine candidates for the captain‘s position would be
considered for seven openings in the captain‘s jobs. Thus, even though a number of black and
Hispanic firefighters passed the tests, they would not receive consideration for the open positions
because their test scores did not rank them among the very top. Some jurisdictions use
―banding‖ rather than hiring from a list in which scores within a range are considered equal for
purposes of consideration. This practice may have permitted the consideration of some of the
black or Hispanic firefighters who passed the test. Janet Helms, an expert in how race and culture
influence test performance, testified that, regardless of the type of written test administered,
members of underrepresented groups will fare worse than whites.42
4. Considering Less Discriminatory Alternatives
Even assuming that the test was job related and consistent with business necessity as a matter
of law, much of the testimony in the subsection above would also be relevant to the proof of less
discriminatory alternatives. Differential weighting, for example, of the oral and written tests the
evidence suggested, might have a less discriminatory effect. Use of ―banding‖ rather than a list
with a ―rule of three‖ would also be a valid less discriminatory alternative. Finally, there was
testimony that other departments had used ―assessment centers‖ to assess command presence,
rather than pen and paper tests, and that use of these centers eliminated the disparate results
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554 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.
129 S. Ct. at 2669.
39
554 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49.
40
Id. at 2669 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41
554 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
42
129 S. Ct. at 2669.
38

sometimes obtained from written exams while simultaneously assessing more accurately how the
firefighter would perform in the actual job itself.
5. Ricci: What Result Should Have Obtained?
Certainly, especially given that the Supreme Court had established a new standard and that
there had never been a trial, this evidence should have been sufficient for a remand with an
opportunity to do more discovery on the issues in question. This evidence, presented by the
defendant, appears to create at least genuine issues of material fact on the question of whether a
strong basis in evidence exists as to whether the test was job related and consistent with business
necessity and whether a less discriminatory alternative existed. The Supreme Court‘s conclusion
that as a matter of law the defendant‘s proof was insufficient appears to create a very high
standard for determining whether an employer can defend its decision to throw out the results of
a promotional test. This opinion will therefore create incentives for employers to use tests that
have disparate results because of the difficulty of defending a decision not to use the test. While
it may also create an interest in employers to get it right before administering the testing
mechanisms, it appears to raise the bar for plaintiffs in disparate impact cases, and may therefore
discourage employers from attempting to assure that its testing mechanisms do not have a
disparate impact on minorities. It will be likely much more difficult for minority plaintiffs to
prove disparate impact cases in the future. Thus, Ricci tips the balance toward white, nonminority plaintiffs who have not suffered from structural discrimination, a type of discrimination
that is better remedied by disparate impact than disparate treatment claims.43 But perhaps, a more
generous reading of the Supreme Court‘s decision is in order as the next subsection discusses.
B. Saved by the Second Circuit?: Interpreting Ricci for Reasonable Results in a
Disparate Impact Case
In U.S. v. Brennan,44 the Second Circuit interpreted ―strong basis in evidence‖ to include
evidence of 1) a prima facie case of disparate impact or a strong basis in evidence of a disparate
impact; and 2) a strong basis in evidence either that the employment test was neither job related
nor business necessity or that there was an equally valid, less discriminatory alternative that the
employer refused to adopt.45 A strong basis in evidence, according to the Second Circuit,
requires more than speculation or a few strands of evidence but less than a preponderance of
evidence required for liability.46 It is an objective test that is measured at the time that the public
entity made its race- or gender-conscious decision. 47 The court states:
We think Ricci suggests that a strong basis in evidence is a balanced
standard that falls somewhere in the middle between these upper and
lower extremes. In borrowing the strong-basis-in-evidence standard from
a line of Equal Protection cases, the Ricci Court stated that those cases
43

See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning) Discrimination, Race-ing Test Fairness
10-11 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 09-30, Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2009-49, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1507344#.
44
__ F.3d __ (2d Cir. 2011); 2011 WL 1679850 (May 5, 2011)
45
Id. at *33.
46
Id.
47
Id.

―recognized the tension between eliminating segregation and
discrimination on the one hand and doing away with all governmentally
imposed discrimination based on race on the other.‖ Balancing those two
goals requires ―evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action
is warranted.‖48
The Second Circuit continues to explain that a strong basis in the evidence is not the
same standard as that in the Equal Protection Clause. Title VII, the Court notes, unlike the Equal
Protection Clause, ―has repeatedly been construed so as not to undermine employers‘ ability to
undertake ‗voluntary compliance,‘ which is ‗the preferred means of achieving objectives of Title
VII.‘‖49 Thus, according to Brennan, in Title VII cases the defendant need not prove its own
violation in order to prevail.
The Second Circuit also interpreted the requirement imposed by Ricci: that the employer
prove that race conscious action is necessary to avoid litigation.50 According to the Second
Circuit, this proof is established as well by demonstrating a strong basis in the evidence that it
was necessary to avoid litigation. In sum, the employer‘s good faith belief is not sufficient proof
in order for the defendant to avoid liability, and the employer needs to prove the objective
standard. Nonetheless, the employer need not prove an actual violation in order to show a strong
basis in the evidence that it was necessary to use the race conscious remedy. 51
The Second Circuit‘s interpretation should help guide employers who attempt to protect
themselves from both disparate treatment and disparate impact litigation. It creates a balance
between the requirements of disparate treatment and disparate impact, a balance that I hope
employers will consider in determining whether to throw out results of promotional tests or other
sorting mechanisms in the workplace. Of course, the Court in Ricci seemed to say that the
timing matters. Employers who are at the front end of the process – who are creating
promotional tests, for example, seem still to be able to consider race or gender in creating the
tests.52 But an unfortunate employer who is faced with disparate results of a promotional test
48

Id. at *36 (citations omitted)
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need not despair. Ricci and Brennan, when considered together, should encourage the employer
who is in this position carefully to collect evidence before making a decision to throw the test
results out. If the employer can find significant evidence to support the position that the test is
not job related and consistent with business necessity or that there are good alternatives to the
test given, that employer may still be able to disregard the test results. It is far safer, however,
for the employer to anticipate the potential problems before administering the test and not to
announce or administer the test if there may be problems with the test.
C. Disparate Treatment – Does it Benefit from Ricci?
In Ricci‘s “Color-Blind” Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended
Consequences?, Michael Zimmer acknowledges damage done to disparate impact theory but
sees a potential silver lining in easing of Title VII requirements to prove disparate treatment.53
He explains that before Ricci mere consideration of a person‘s race or gender was insufficient to
constitute race or sex discrimination. The employer must have a purpose to discriminate because
of an individual‘s membership in the protected class. Now, Zimmer argues, consideration alone
of the individual‘s race or membership in a protected group is sufficient to trigger liability under
the disparate treatment theory of discrimination. While I acknowledge that Zimmer might be
right, I am skeptical that lower courts will read Ricci as permitting a lesser showing in intentional
discrimination cases, especially those cases brought by women and minorities. This conclusion is
bolstered by the Court‘s most recent employment discrimination case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,54 in which the five member majority expressed skepticism at the importance and use of
―social frameworks theory‖ which explains why supervisors‘ subjective decision making can be
infused with bias.55
Although the issue before the Court in Dukes was the propriety of a class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) where the plaintiffs had demanded backpay, the
majority in Dukes reached out to question the underlying theory of discrimination that Wal-Mart
was responsible for the discriminatory results of subjective decision making of its supervisors
when promoting in-store managers or giving pay raises. In Wal-Mart the differential between
men and women was substantial: women constituted 70% of the hourly jobs but only 33% of
management and women were paid less than men in every region; the salary gaps between men
and women widened over time even when they were performing the same job. 56 While the more
liberal justices argued in the oral argument that this difference may be sufficient to hold an
employer liable for discriminatory intent, the justices in the majority found this evidence
unconvincing.57 Instead, the majority opinion clung to the importance of the retailer‘s formal
written policy against sex discrimination. Without an overall policy of discrimination or
significant evidence of common treatment, the Court refused to allow the plaintiffs to develop
their case.
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Both Ricci and Wal-Mart, thus, advocate an approach that heightens the importance of
formal policies, direct evidence of explicit conscious discrimination. I am more concerned about
the viability after Ricci and the recent case in Wal-Mart v. Dukes of the implicit bias as
constituting intentional discrimination in a systemic disparate treatment case or its use in a
disparate impact case where the neutral practice is subjective decision making. The failure to
recognize implicit bias and unconscious discrimination in a world where the face of
discrimination is changing is troublesome, and it, too, makes it more difficult for those originally
intended as the beneficiaries of Title VII. Because of a fear of litigation and liability and
society‘s aversion to racism and to a lesser extent, sexism, there is less overt evidence of
discrimination against women and persons of color. But, the statistics and anecdotal evidence in
Dukes v. Wal-Mart make clear that everything is not alright. We have not overcome racial or
sex discrimination in employment.
III.

CONCLUSION

In concluding that the defendants violated the statute‘s ban on disparate treatment, Ricci
emphasizes an ahistorical view of discrimination. It views the only wrong as the defendants‘
overt and conscious use of race to overturn the test results. It ignores, however, the defendants‘
reason for doing so and the history of racial discrimination in the country that has led to practices
and structures causing a disparate impact on persons of color. At the same time, the Court
narrowed the definition of disparate impact. It concluded that as a matter of law that the
defendant did not have a strong basis in evidence to support its failure to use the concededly
disparate results from a promotional test. This conclusion occurred in response to a new standard
for which the defendants had not prepared. All of the evidence presented by the defendant, at a
minimum, seems to point to questions of fact for jury determination.58
The Court‘s emphasis on overt discrimination in disparate treatment cases and its failure to
take seriously the disparate impact of the test and the possibility of less discriminatory
alternatives make it significantly easier for whites than racial minorities to bring race
discrimination cases.59 This is because racial minorities have historically been harmed by
structural discrimination that is better addressed by disparate impact cases. Because many of the
structures challenged were designed with white men in mind, they tend to favor whites, even if
the benefit may not be intentional. A limitation on disparate impact cases will, therefore, harm
persons of color. Where a race-conscious remedy is considered intentional discrimination as it
was in Ricci, white men are benefitted, and persons of color lose. This result fosters a narrow
definition of discrimination that embodies overt conscious acts, a definition that ignores the most
recent social science research demonstrating the prevalence of subconsciously held negative
attitudes by whites towards members of racial minorities. Besides minorities, women of all races
will also lose from a redefinition of discrimination that disregards historical discrimination and
that ignores implicit bias toward men.
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But there may be some hope for employers who are trying to assure diversity in all ranks of
their workplaces. Employers need carefully to consider all the evidence before they put into
place promotional tests and other employment criteria. If they are surprised by a disparate
impact resulting from a test or other neutral policy, they need to gather significant evidence of
the impact, and of possible alternatives to the test or policy so that they can make out the strong
basis in evidence defense. Employers should also become aware of the structures and systems
that encourage subjective decision making that may result in unconscious bias or prejudice and
attempt to overcome these systems and practices. Ricci definitely makes this effort more
difficult, but perhaps not impossible.

